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It is generally agreed that the funding base for German universities is inadequate 
and perhaps the time has come for serious consideration of the imposition of non-
trivial tuition charges. Against this background, this paper compares conventional and 
income contingent loans for ﬁ  nancing tuition fees at German universities. With the use 
of unconditional age-income quantile regression approaches our analysis considers 
two critical aspects of the loan debate: the size of repayment burdens associated with 
normal mortgage-style loans, and the time structure of revenue to the government 
from a hypothetical income contingent loan scheme. It is found that tuition fees at 
German universities could increase considerably with the use of an income contingent 
loan system based on current policy approaches used in Australia, England and New 
Zealand.
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Despite the high demand for qualiﬁed people in the German economy, total spending on
tertiary education in Germany is below the OECD average (OECD, 2010). Although
the German government recognises the need for larger investments in higher education
of young generations, the ﬁnancial scope in the presence of unprecedented public debt
and declining tax revenue is rather small. In response several German states introduced
tuition fees of up to e500 per semester since summer 2007 to cover a small fraction
of the annual cost of about e7,000 per student; publicly owned banks have started to
oﬀer student loans to ﬁnance these fees.1
The pressures to introduce or increase tuition fees are apparently inexorable and
shared with many other countries. This is evidenced in the UK for example, with the
history of debate concerning the role and introduction of income contingent loans for
tuition2 and from the controversial plans announced for English universities’ tuition
charges in late 2010.
A critical point for policy is that it is well known in a context of less-than trivial
enrolment costs that student loan systems are essential for both eﬃciency and equity
reasons.3 It is a context in which signiﬁcant increases in tuition charges are inevitable
for Germany that motivates the discussion following concerning types and implications
of expanded student loan schemes.
In this paper we analyse two diﬀerent aspects of alternative student loan policies in a
German context, which are: a normal “mortgage-style” system, such as those used in the
US and Canada; and, an alternative approach to using income contingent loans (ICLs)
for ﬁnancing tuition fees, similar to Australia’s Higher Education Contribution Scheme
(HECS) and the student loan systems of England and New Zealand. We illustrate
1According to the Federal Statistical Oﬃce (2008), the average annual public expenditure
on tertiary education per student in 2005 was e7,180.
2See Barr (1993), Chapman (1997) and Greenaway and Hayes (2003).
3See Friedman (1955) and Chapman (2006).
4salient issues for both schemes in the case in which annual tuition fees at German
universities increase to e3,500 per student to cover about 50 percent of the total cost.4
As input the following analysis focuses on two important elements of the student loan
debate: the likely “repayment burdens” (the share of a person’s income that is needed
to service a debt) associated with a typical loan, and the time structure of repayments of
an alternative approach, an income contingent loan (ICL). These exercises are described
in detail below, and they allow us to draw inferences about the eﬃcacy for Germany of
alternative tuition loan schemes.
Both aspects of the analysis require recent data concerning graduates’ projected
lifetime incomes and to this end we utilise the German Microcensus 2007, which includes
a large representative sample of university graduates. It is necessary to estimate age-
income proﬁles in a disaggregated way to allow insights into the underlying importance
of graduate income distributions by age. Consequentially we use unconditional quantile
regression models for four demographic groups, diﬀerentiating between men and women
residing in East and West Germany.
The empirical ﬁndings highlight some potentially signiﬁcant problems associated
with repayment diﬃculties in the application of a mortgage-type loan system to assist
in the ﬁnancing of the imposition of tuition to German universities. We ﬁnd also that
a hypothetical income contingent loan system for Germany has signiﬁcant elements
of ﬁnancial feasibility and seems to be workable in terms of repayment periods, even
for most of the lowest income graduates. This suggests that the imposition of tuition
fees at levels commensurate with those of other countries, paid through an income
contingent loan, could be made to deliver considerable revenue for the government
without disrupting the access of prospective university students.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 sets the scene through a description of
some of the movements towards student loans in contemporary Germany and outlines
relevant aspects of institutional conditions in the German context. Conceptual issues
concerning the design of loan systems are considered in Section 3 and Section 4 reports
4This amount is comparable to the current maximum tuition fee of £3,290 (about e4,000)
for the 2010/2011 academic year in the UK, and similar to tuition levels in Australia, Canada
and New Zealand.
5projected repayment burdens with respect to a mortgage-type loan. Section 5 examines
the repayment structures associated with a hypothetical income contingent loan system
similar to those currently in operation in Australia, England and New Zealand.
2 Current Institutional Arrangements of German
Student Loan Systems
In 2009/2010, around 250,000 students began study at one of the 110 universities in
Germany. Less than 11,000 students currently attend one of the 10 private universities,
while the total number of students at German universities is about 1.4 million. About 11
percent of the students at German institutions of higher education are foreign-born.5
Given that German universities had previously been free for all students (except
for a lump-sum fee for administrative and other purposes), loan schemes have been
designed only for the funding of student’s living expenses.6 However, since summer
2007 tuition fees of up to e500 per semester were introduced in the following seven
states: Baden-W¨ urttemberg, Bavaria, Hamburg, Hesse, Lower Saxony, North Rhine-
Westphalia and Saarland. While there has been political disquiet over these reforms
to tuition there have also been concomitant institutional changes designed to assist
students in ﬁnancing their tuition.
Speciﬁcally, as a result of the introduction of tuition fees, some publicly owned
banks now oﬀer student loans to cover these fees, and Table 1 provides an overview
of loan conditions.7 Typically all students are eligible for a loan if general tuition fees
are collected in their state, but there are maximum age limits in all states varying
5Both the Federal Statistical Oﬃce (http://www.destatis.de) and the association
of universities and other higher education institutions (Hochschulrektorenkonferenz,
http://www.hochschulkompass.de) regularly publish the most recent student and university
numbers on their websites.
6The Federal Training Assistance Act (Bundesausbildungsf¨ orderungsgesetz or BAf¨ oG)t h a t
regulates student loans for ﬁnancing living expenses focuses on students from low-income
households. The eligibility for these student loans typically depends on the parents’ income.
A more detailed discussion of these loans is beyond the scope of this paper.
7Detailed information about public loans for ﬁnancing tuition fees at German universities
is provided on http://www.studis-online.de and http://www.bafoeg-aktuell.de.
6between 35 years in Lower Saxony and 60 years in North Rhine-Westphalia. In addition,
students may only receive a loan for up to 2 years after their regular period of study
(which depends on study ﬁeld).
With the systems noted above loan repayments typically start after the end of a
deferment period, which lasts between 1.5 and 2 years, and monthly repayments vary
between e20 and e150. Interest rate charges also vary considerably across states and
there are some upper debt limits (the maximum amount that has to be repaid), reported
in Table 1. Since this debt limit may also include loans that were provided for ﬁnancing
living expenses, former students who have received a suﬃciently high loan for their living
expenses do not have to repay the loan they received to cover tuition fees.
<Table 1 about here>
This discussion highlights two critical aspects of current approaches to student ﬁ-
nancing in Germany. These are that currently: (a) there are disparate student loan
schemes across Germany; and (b) the arrangements in place are insuﬃciently large or
comprehensive to accommodate the major expansion in student ﬁnancing which would
be necessitated in a context of radical changes in tuition charges. A case can be made
for institutional changes, highlighting the need for detailed consideration of the costs
and beneﬁts of student loan scheme alternatives, and this now follows.
3 Conceptual Issues Concerning the Choice Between
Loan Schemes
3.1 The Need for Government Intervention in Higher Educa-
tion Financing
A signiﬁcant ﬁnancing issue for higher education is that there is generally seen to
be a case for both a contribution from students and a taxpayer subsidy (Barr, 2001;
Chapman, 2006). An important question is: is there a role for government beyond the
provision of the subsidy?
7An understanding of the issue is facilitated through consideration of what would
happen if there were no higher education ﬁnancing assistance involving the public sector.
That is, a government could simply provide the appropriate level of taxpayer support
to higher education institutions to reﬂect the presumed value of the externalities from
the process, and leave market mechanisms to take their course, which would result in
institutions charging tuition on enrolment for the service.
However, there are major problems with this arrangement, traceable in most in-
stances to the potent presence of risk and uncertainty. This critical point was ﬁrst
raised in Friedman (1955). The argument can be best understood with reference to
the nexus between labour markets and human capital investments. The essential point
is that educational investments are risky, with the main areas of uncertainty being as
follows:8
(a) Enrolling students do not know fully their capacities for (and perhaps even true
interest in) the higher education discipline of their choice. This means in an ex-
treme they cannot be sure that they will graduate with, in Australia for example,
around 25 percent of students ending up without a qualiﬁcation;
(b) even given that university completion is expected, students will not be aware of
their likely relative success in the area of study. This will depend not just on their
own abilities, but also on the skills of others competing for jobs in the area;
(c) there is uncertainty concerning the future value of the investment. For example,
the labour market – including the labour market for graduates in speciﬁc skill
areas – is undergoing constant change. What looked like a good investment at
the time it began might turn out to be a poor choice when the process is ﬁnished;
and
(d) many prospective students, particularly those from disadvantaged backgrounds,
may not have much information concerning graduate incomes, due in part to a
lack of contact with graduates.
8As discussed by Barr (2001), Palacios (2004) and Chapman (2006).
8These uncertainties are associated with important risks for both borrowers and lenders.
The important point is that if the future incomes of students turn out to be lower than
expected, the individual is unable to sell part of the investment to re-ﬁnance a diﬀerent
educational path, for example. For a prospective lender, a bank, the risk is compounded
by the reality that in the event of a student borrower defaulting on the loan obligation,
there is no available collateral to be sold, a fact traceable in part to the illegality of
slavery. And even if it was possible for a third party to own and sell human capital,
its future value might turn out to be quite low taking into account the above-noted
uncertainties associated with higher education investments.
It follows that, left to itself the market will not deliver propitious higher educa-
tion outcomes in a context in which there are signiﬁcant tuition charges. Prospective
students judged to be relatively risky (for example, those without loan repayment guar-
antors), will not be able to access the ﬁnancial resources required for both the payment
of tuition and to cover income support. There would be eﬃciency losses (talented but
poor prospective students would be excluded), and distributional inequities (the non-
attainment of equality of educational opportunity). It is clear then that government
intervention of some form is thus required.
The capital market failure with respect to higher education ﬁnancing is apparently
understood by the governments of most countries, given that public sector loan in-
terventions are commonplace internationally. Until recently, government intervention
often took the form of public sector guarantees for commercial bank provision of edu-
cation loans, but over the last decade or so has increasingly involved income contingent
loans. While quite diﬀerent in practice, both approaches are motivated in part by the
recognition that, left alone, a German higher education market with non-trivial tuition
charges will function poorly.
3.2 The Costs and Beneﬁts of Mortgage-type Loans
As noted, and most simply, international student loan schemes involve ﬁxed repayments
with a set time period9 as, for example, with a house mortgage. While this seems to
9These approaches are used in the US and Canada for example (see Chapman, 2006).
9address the capital market failure, it raises other problems.
A ﬁrst concern with mortgage-type loan systems is that students face an important
default issue. This is that some may be reluctant to borrow for fear of not being able
to meet future repayment obligations. Not being able to meet repayment obligations
has the potential to inﬂict signiﬁcant damage to a person’s credit reputation (and thus
access to future borrowing, for example, for the purchase of a house). These concerns
imply that there will be less borrowing than there would be in the absence of this
default concern.
A reluctance to borrow due to the uncertainty of repayment constitutes what might
be labeled an ex ante default problem for prospective students. There is also an ex
post problem, which is that a proportion of those students who took the credit risk of
borrowing for a human capital investment will end up not being able to repay because
of low incomes. In these circumstances default imposes a potentially large cost on those
unlucky borrowers who do poorly in the labour market. Signiﬁcantly, research suggests
that members of the default group are predominantly those who ultimately experienced
relatively high unemployment rates and relatively low earnings.10
A related problem for students with bank loans concerns possible consumption dif-
ﬁculties associated with ﬁxed repayments. If the expected path of future incomes is
variable, a ﬁxed level of a debt payment increases the variance of disposable (after
debt repayment) incomes. The point has been illustrated with examples based on the
US11 and Thailand12, and is taken up empirically below with respect to prospective
German experience. The consequences of a student defaulting on a loan obligation is
a potentially critical issue for borrowing to ﬁnance human capital investments, due to
the uncertainties noted above. A consequence is that some eligible prospective stu-
dents will not be prepared to take bank loans. This problem can be traced essentially
to the fact that mortgage-type loan repayments are insensitive to borrowers’ ﬁnancial
10Dynarski (1994) used the National Post-secondary Student Aid Study and found strong
evidence that experiencing low earnings after leaving formal education is a strong determinant
of default. Importantly, borrowers from low-income households, and minorities, were more
likely to default, as were those who did not complete their studies.
11See Chapman and Lounkaew (2010a).
12See Chapman et al. (2010).
10circumstances.
A ﬁnal possible practical problem of government guaranteed bank loans relates to
the fact that, in many countries, loans of this type are not universally available, or avail-
able loan levels are limited.13 This is because loan provision and/or amounts available
are usually means-tested on the basis of family income. This raises the important issue
explained by Carneiro and Heckman (2002), concerning the role of the sharing of ﬁnan-
cial resources within families. Some students will be unable to access necessary levels
of borrowing and will face the same credit market failure as they would in the absence
of a government guarantee of a bank loan. Making loans available on a means tested
basis (as is the case in the US and Canada) suggests that some prospective students
will have diﬃculties accessing the system.
The bottom line is that, even though government assisted conventional loans are a
common form internationally of public sector involvement in higher education ﬁnancing,
such an approach has several apparently very signiﬁcant weaknesses.
3.3 The Costs and Beneﬁts of Income Contingent Loans
A diﬀerent approach to student ﬁnancing involves income contingent loans, such as
Australia’s HECS. The attraction of these schemes is that they can be designed to
avoid many of the problems associated with having loan repayments set on the basis of
time only.
First, given an eﬃcient collection mechanism, there is no default issue as such for
either students or the government. That is, if the tax system works well and is used
to collect the debt, it is extremely diﬃcult for the vast majority of graduates to avoid
repayment. There is a form of a default issue in that some students will not pay back in
full, because income contingent systems are designed to excuse some former student’s
payments because their lifetime incomes are too low.14 Other reasons loans may not be
13Eligibility for Canada student loans is limited to less than half of all students (Finnie and
Schwartz, 1996).
14Evidence with respect to the Australian experience suggests that around 20 percent of
the debt is uncollected, mostly because of the relatively low incomes of some former students
(Chapman, 2006).
11repaid include death and emigration.
Second, because repayments depend on income, there should be no concerns by
students with respect to incapacity to repay the debt, or hardships associated with
repayments. That is, once an individual’s income determines repayment, and so long
as the repayment parameters are suﬃciently generous, it is not possible to default or
hardship because of a lack of capacity to pay. This is the critical practical advantage
of income contingent collection schemes – unlike any other form of assistance, there is
insurance against default and repayment diﬃculties.
Third, there is no concern with intra-family sharing so long as the scheme is univer-
sal. That is, no student would be denied access through the imposition of means-testing
arrangements that could exclude some whose parents or partners are unwilling to help.
The above discussion means that income contingent loan schemes have signiﬁcant
advantages over traditional ﬁnancing arrangements, since they can be designed to avoid
the major problems of their alternatives. This does not make such approaches a panacea
generally, however for at least one critical reason: for an income contingent scheme to
be made operational it is essential that there is an eﬃcient administrative collection
mechanism.15 Unlike the situation in countries with poorly developed governance infras-
tructure, there should be little doubt that the German income tax system is suﬃciently
sophisticated to allow eﬃcacious ICL collection.
4 Understanding Repayment Burdens in the Stu-
dent Loan Debate
4.1 What Is a Loan Repayment Burden?
Education economists and others have examined the concept and implications of student
loan repayment burdens for more than a quarter of a century.16 Deﬁned simply, a loan
repayment burden is the proportion of a person’s income that needs to be allocated to
15For detailed discussion of this issue see Chapman (2006), pages 101-104.
16See Woodhall (1987), Ziderman (1999), Schwartz and Finnie (2002), Salmi (2003) and
Baum and Schwartz (2006).
12service a debt per period, or, formally:
Repayment burden in period t =
Loan repayment in period t
Income in period t
. (1)
There are several policy design issues usually raised with respect to repayment burdens.
The ﬁrst is motivated by the importance of diﬃculties faced by debtors in meeting their
obligations, it obviously being the case that – in a world in which borrowing against
expected future earnings is diﬃcult17 – the higher is a debtor’s repayment burden the
less consumption and/or savings are possible at any given income. This is of importance
in comparisons of diﬀerent student loan policies, with mortgage-type loans being quite
diﬀerent to income contingent loans in this respect. This is due to the fact that the
latter are explicitly designed to avoid high repayment burdens and this is achieved
through per period debt servicing obligations as a proportion of income being capped
by legislation (Chapman and Lounkaew, 2010a).18
A second is that greater repayment burdens are associated with higher prospects
that debtors will be forced to default on loan repayments because of low incomes. This
issue is substantiated by the ﬁnding of Dynarski (1994) and Gross et al. (2009) that
student loan defaulters in the US are much more likely to have low levels of income.
Typically student loan schemes (such as Staﬀord loans in the US) are associated with a
government guarantee to cover the debts when a student defaults,19 which means that
taxpayers pay. An associated policy mechanism relates to the provision of interest rate
subsidies on student loans,20 which are presumably designed to diminish consumption
hardship and default probabilities.
Woodhall (1987) integrates these concerns by stressing that governments face a bal-
ancing act in the design of mortgage-type loan schemes. This is that, ceteris paribus,
the lower are interest rate subsidies the higher will be repayment burdens. The design
17The issue of credit constraints is critical in understanding repayment burdens and is
addressed in Rothstein and Rouse (2007) and Chapman (2006).
18In the Australian income contingent higher education loan scheme, for example, the max-
imum percentage of taxable income of the debt that is repaid is 8 percent per annum.
19It is commonly understood that the commercial ﬁnancing sector will not provide loans
to students because of their lack of collateral in the event of default (Friedman, 1955; Barr,
2003; Chapman, 2006).
20For recent analyses see Ziderman (2003) and Chapman and Lounkaew (2010a).
13complexities do not end with this obvious trade-oﬀ because the lower are interest rate
subsidies the greater is the prospect of default, with this adding to taxpayer contribu-
tions.
Important research is provided by Shen and Ziderman (2009) which oﬀers calcula-
tions of taxpayer interest rate subsidies for a large number of student loan schemes from
many countries, and Schwartz and Finnie (2002) which presents repayment burdens for
hypothetical debtors in the Canada Student Loans scheme. As well, Chapman et al.
(2010) illustrates taxpayer subsidies associated with the Thai Student Loan Fund. With
this as policy background we now examine several empirical aspects of the debate.
4.2 Repayment Burdens: How Much Is Too Much?
Do we know what proportion of a debtor’s income repayment burdens should be limited
to? A deﬁnition of what this means in practice is illusory, and diﬀerent terms are used
to imply similar debtor experiences.
For example, Woodhall (1987) uses the term “manageable debt” and suggests that
this depends “...partly on the level and pattern of graduates’ expected earnings, and
partly on what students and society regard as a ‘reasonable’ level of debt” (page 15).
Second, Ziderman (1999) suggests that loan conditions need to be set so as “...to avoid
imposing unduly harsh repayment burdens on borrowers...” (page 82). Third, it is ar-
gued in Baum and Schwartz (2006) that the policy design issue is to avoid repayments
which would “...impose too heavy a burden on young people leaving school.” (page 1).
While there is not a clear concensus for assessing what constitutes an excessive repay-
ment burden there are nevertheless several pointers for understanding what this might
be in practice. The following provide useful indications of the range of views:
(a) “A rough yardstick, used in several countries, is that loan repayments should not
exceed 8 to 10 percent of a graduate’s income, and that this should determine the
maximum debt that students may incur” (Woodhall, 1987, page15); and
(b) Salmi (2003) notes that in Venezuala the government loan agency “...has estab-
lished 15 percent as the ceiling for monthly repayments.” (page 15), and goes on
14to suggest that “Experience shows that no repayment schedule can be sustainable
when the monthly debt exceeds 18 percent of income”.
The most comprehensive analysis is in Baum and Schwartz (2006), which refers to the
so-called “8 percent rule”, a standard suggesting that “...students should not devote
more than 8 percent of their gross income to repayment of student loans.” (page 2).
Their paper quotes an extensive literature in support, albeit recognizing the validity of
a range in suggested boundaries. In what follows we apply the rough rule of thumb to
suggest that less than 8 percent repayment burdens are manageable, and that beyond
about double this proportion should be considered to be quite excessive.21
4.3 Measuring Expected Incomes in Calculations of Repay-
ment Burdens
The denominator of equation (1), the per-period income received by student loan
debtors, is critical to the exercise. An important point is that until recently signif-
icant research has used very aggregate proxies of incomes, such as that received on
average by graduates. Ziderman (2003), for example, in an analysis of the repayment
burdens associated with the Thai Student Loan Fund, compared debt servicing obli-
gations to the earnings of graduates using average Thai graduate earnings by age and
sex.
From this Ziderman concludes that “The annual repayment burden in terms of
annual income is very light, in the region of only 2-4 percent annually” (page 83), and
adds that “...the Thai student loan scheme is overly generous...which may be eﬀortlessly
repaid out of higher income received on courses of schooling.” (page 83). However,
beyond average graduate earnings there are wide dispersions of income received by
graduates.22 Like many issues in economics, some of the most interesting empirical
21The issue should not be considered to be only about the welfare diﬃculties experienced
by those with high burdens. It is also about the likelihood that high burdens lead to loan
defaulting and thus longer term costs for both debtors and taxpayers.
22This fact is highlighted by the relatively low explanatory power for OLS earnings function
models. For example, Chapman and Lounkaew (2010a) found an R2 of around 0.4 for Thai
earning functions; a plethora of other earnings function studies typically explain no more than
20-30 percent of the variance.
15aspects concern the tails of the distributions.
Chapman et al. (2010) analyse earnings distributions by age of Thai graduates
and ﬁnd that repayment burdens diﬀer by extraordinarily high amounts; the range is
between 1 percent for the top 25 percent of earners and 70 percent for the bottom 10
percent of earners. Chapman and Lounkaew (2010a) repeat these exercises for the US
and also ﬁnd a very large range of burdens across the earnings distribution in that
country.23 These are signiﬁcant ﬁndings for what follows.
5 Estimating Repayment Burdens for a German Stu-
dent Loans System
5.1 A Hypothetical Loans Scheme Described
In our empirical examination of potential repayment burdens with respect to a German
mortgage-type student loan scheme, we require two separate pieces of information,
which are estimates of the numerator and denominator of Equation (1). The numerator
is given by the loan repayment ﬁgure per year which applies from an assumed level of
borrowing for tuition in combination with an assumed repayment period and real rate
of interest. For illustrative purposes we propose a hypothetical loan characterised by
the following dimensions:
(a) A total debt of e17,500 which comes as a result of a student undertaking a ﬁve-
year degree with tuition charges of e3,500 per full-time year per annum;
(b) a ten year repayment period for the debt, with repayments beginning two years
after graduation;
(c) graduation occurs at age 26 and thus repayments begin at age 28;
(d) a real interest rate on the debt of 3 percent per annum24, which applies at the
23For example, it is found that the repayment burden for female lawyers working in the
public sector in the bottom 25% of their income distribution will be required to repay 93%.
24That is, CPI inﬂation plus 3 percent. This is about what is charged with Staﬀord Loans
in the US (Chapman and Lounkaew, 2010b).
16time of disbursement of the monies, assumed to be at the beginning at each year
of study; and
(e) a 10 year period of repayment.25
In order to derive a structure of expected repayment burdens for a typical student/graduate,
we need also to construct a hypothetical education/work experience and this relies on
the following assumptions:
(a) Students enrol in higher education for the ﬁrst time at age 21;26
(b) the degree takes ﬁve years and the student is assumed to complete the course in
the minimum time; and
(c) graduates enter the labour force immediately after completing the degree, at
age 26.
Figure 1 shows the expected repayments for the hypothetical debtor, and the amounts
at each age become the numerator of Equation (1). The amounts in real terms are
assumed to decline by 2 percent per annum, reﬂecting our assumption of expected
German annual CPI increases.27
<Figure 1 about here>
5.2 Income Data
For diﬀerent calculations of the denominator of Equation (1) we use data from the
German Microcensus 2007, an annual representative cross-sectional survey of 1 percent
of all German households collected by the German Federal Statistical Oﬃce. The data
set includes information concerning the economic and social situation of individuals
25Based on typical repayment periods for student loans currently in operation in Germany
and the ﬁgure which applies to most Staﬀord Loans in the US (Chapman and Lounkaew,
2010b).
26In this scenario high school is assumed to be completed at age 19 and this is followed by
a year of military/civil service. Although the enrolment age is likely to decline in the near
future, an enrolment age of 21 years was quite common among current university graduates.
27This ﬁgure is about the average inﬂation rate for the period after the German reuniﬁcation
(http://www.destatis.de).
17and households, and includes, among other things, information on sex, education, age,
income and employment status.
The Microcensus constitutes an excellent data source for the purpose of our analysis,
because it includes a large sample of university graduates and allows the construction of
all relevant variables. However, due to the design of the survey and the questionnaire,
assumptions have to be made to determine the annual income variable that is needed
for the empirical analysis. We use the self-reported monthly net income from all income
sources (including wages and salaries, bonus payments, business income, unemployment
and social beneﬁts, child allowance, interest income, etc.) of non-employed individuals
and approximate the monthly gross income of employed individuals – using an online
income tax calculator28 for the year 2007 – to calculate the annual (gross) income of
employed and non-employed individuals.29 The Microcensus further includes informa-
tion concerning the year in which the highest degree was obtained and this allows us
to calculate the years of potential labour market experience for each individual.
We restrict our sample to university graduates with German citizenship aged be-
tween 26 and 65 years of age, and we have excluded persons who are in the military or
recorded as having zero income even though they are employed. After dropping all ob-
servations with missing values on one of the relevant variables, our sample includes 7,847
male and 7,200 female graduates residing in West Germany and 2,567 male and 2,428
female graduates in East Germany. Of these, 7,109 male and 5,973 female graduates in
West Germany as well as 2,170 male and 2,009 female graduates in East Germany are
employed. Table 2 includes summary statistics for the sample of both employed and
not employed individuals.30
<Table 2 about here>
The numbers do not only reveal sizeable diﬀerences between men and women, but
also between West and East Germany, it being clear that diﬀerences in the labour
28See http://www.parmentier.de/steuer/incometax.htm. Monthly gross income is calcu-
lated separately for single and married households with and without children.
29We deﬁne annual income as 12 times the monthly income.
30The labour force status of debtors is irrelevant in our calculation of repayment burdens
since debts are owed on the basis of time.
18markets of the two regions persist two decades after the German reuniﬁcation. Other
points of interest are that: the average income of male graduates in West Germany are
much higher than those of male graduates in East Germany; while female graduates
have lower incomes than male graduates, the income diﬀerential between female gradu-
ates in West and East Germany is quite small; female labour force participation among
graduates is about 83 percent in both regions; and the employment rate among male
graduates is about 91 percent in West Germany and 85 percent in East Germany. Over-
all, these data highlight considerable diﬀerences between men and women in the two
regions which explains why we have chosen to perform our empirical analysis separately
for the four groups.
5.3 Predicted Income Functions
In order to calculate the repayment ﬂow of an income contingent loan, we estimate
the age-income proﬁle for each subgroup by employing a standard income regression
model, which includes a quadratic function of potential labour market experience. We
are particularly interested in the age-income proﬁle of graduates who are at least 28
years old because we assume that individuals typically graduate at age 26 and that loan
repayment begins after the end of a 2-year deferment period. We use the estimates of
the potential labour market experience to predict incomes, taking into account that
a typical 28-year old university graduate will have 2 years of potential labour market
experience.
A methodological problem arises from the nonlinear nature of the dependent vari-
able because income is measured in brackets rather than on a continuous scale. For that
reason, interval regressions represent the most appropriate way of estimating our in-
come functions. However, the interval regression model inhibits distributional analyses
because it may only be used to estimate mean eﬀects of the regressors on the dependent
variable. Fortunately, the number of income brackets is suﬃciently large (there are 24
categories) to justify the use of mean points and to estimate linear rather than interval
regression models.31
31A comparison of linear and interval regression estimates suggests that there are no quali-
19Since the proﬁles may diﬀer considerably across the income distribution, we extend
our calculation of proﬁles beyond the mean. This is a critical aspect of our exercise
because it allows the calculation of a large number and range of repayment burdens for
individuals predicted to be signiﬁcantly diﬀerent to the mean.
To estimate age-income proﬁles at particular quantiles of the distribution we employ
unconditional quantile regressions based on so-called “re-centered inﬂuence functions”
(Firpo et al., 2009). Since unconditional quantile regression estimates capture the eﬀect
of the change in the regressors on the quantile of the unconditional distribution of the
dependent variable, they can be used to predict age-income proﬁles at diﬀerent quantiles
of the distribution. A distributional analysis is crucial in the context of student loans
because repayment burdens are typically most important for debtors with low incomes.
The predicted age-income proﬁles of the four groups are presented in Figure 2.32
Within each of these groups, we diﬀerentiate between the 25th, 50th and 75th per-
centiles.
<Figure 2 about here>
The main broad features of the data are as follows. First, all ﬁgures show that
predicted incomes increase over the life cycle at a decreasing rate. Second, incomes are
highest among male graduates in West Germany, with annual incomes of this group
increasing to almost e120,000 at the 75th percentile, while the annual incomes of East
German male graduates do not even reach e70,000 at the top of the distribution.
Third, annual incomes of female graduates are below e70,000 in West Germany and
below e60,000 in East Germany at the 75th percentile of the respective distribution.
The proﬁles of the four groups also diﬀer considerably at the median and the bottom
of the income distributions, in the following ways. First, we ﬁnd that the median annual
income of male graduates increases to about e80,000 in West Germany but remains
below e50,000 in East Germany, while the median annual income of female graduates
tative diﬀerences in the results between the two approaches and that quantitative diﬀerences
are rather small. Both linear and interval regression estimates are available from the authors
upon request.
32The age-income proﬁles were adjusted by 1.5 percent per annum to capture productivity
growth. A growth rate of about 1.5 percent is in line with usual indicators (OECD, 2008).
20in West and East Germany is lower than e40,000. Second, annual incomes of male
graduates at the 25th percentile are below e50,000 in the West and below e30,000 in
the East, while the incomes of female graduates at the bottom of the distribution reach
about e20,000 in West Germany and about e25,000 in East Germany.
In summary, while the predicted age-income proﬁles have the properties familiar
to exercises of these types, they also illustrate that there is substantial heterogeneity
across the four groups with respect to both the level and the spread of annual incomes.
These proﬁles constitute the starting point for the calculation of the loan repayment
burdens now considered.
5.4 Repayment Burdens of the Conventional Loan Scheme
What now follows considers the repayment burdens for the hypothetical loan scheme
described above, for West and East German graduates assumed to receive quite diﬀerent
lifetime incomes. The results are presented in Table 3.
Some major ﬁndings are that: university graduates with average income would face
repayment burdens of 7.8-14.1 percent in the ﬁrst year of the repayment period, which
for most clearly exceeds the “8 percent rule” advocated by Baum and Schwartz (2006);
as anticipated, repayment burdens are much higher at the 25th percentile of the income
distribution, ranging from 14.2-26.8 percent at the beginning of the repayment period;
in contrast, the repayment burdens are relatively low (between 6.0 and 10.0 percent in
the ﬁrst year of the repayment period) at the 75th percentile of the income distribution,
implying that many university graduates at the top of the distribution could repay their
student loans much faster without diﬃculties.
<Table 3 about here>
A very important point for policy from the above repayment burden results is that
if a conventional student loan scheme is used to help German students ﬁnance higher
levels of tuition charges, there will be signiﬁcant adverse consequences for a signiﬁcant
minority of those using the scheme. Practically all of the women will face diﬃculties,
and for some – East German women in the bottom 25 percent of graduates in this group,
21for example – repayment burdens of as high as 26.8 percent would imply extremely high
probabilities of defaulting on loans. There would then be severe adverse consequences
for both the credit reputations of the individuals involved and with respect to taxpayer
ﬁnanced subsidies.33
6 An Income Contingent Loan for Germany?
The potential for there being signiﬁcant problems with the use of a conventional student
loans system for future German tuition payment raises the possibility of the use of
an alternative ﬁnancing mechanism, income contingent loans (ICL). The conceptual
diﬀerences between mortgage-type loans and ICL have been considered above, with the
main point being that the maximum repayment burden of an ICL is set by legislation.
Thus the essential diﬀerence between loan policies is that because repayments of an
ICL are deﬁned by capacity to pay and mortgage-type repayments depend on time, the
former implicitly oﬀers insurance against repayment hardships and are thus presumed
to minimise defaults due to hardship.
For the policy debate it is useful to speculate on what an ICL for Germany might
look like and what sort of repayment paths might result. To this end we have designed
a hypothetical and very simple ICL for Germany, in which repayment obligations are
assumed to be 8 percent of a debtor’s total annual income.34 Assuming the same level
of debt as for the repayment burden exercises reported above, it is possible to calculate
the time periods associated with repayment for the various income groups deﬁned by
both demography and expected lifetime incomes. These are shown in Table 4, and
33Since repayment burdens are highest at the lower end of the distribution, we have also
estimated the age-income proﬁles at the 10th percentile. These estimates reveal that graduates
at the 10th percentile would face extreme repayment burdens in the ﬁrst year of the repayment
period. Speciﬁcally, we obtain repayment burdens of 37.3 percent for male and 30.6 percent
for female graduates in West Germany and 44.8 percent for male and 59.7 percent for female
graduates in East Germany.
34T h ea s s u m e dI C Lc a nb ec o m p a r e dt ot h o s ei no p e r a t i o ni nA u s t r a l i a ,i nw h i c ht h e r ei s
a threshold of income below which no repayments are required, after which given progressive
proportions of income are required for repayment and these range from 4 to 8 percent. In
the English and New Zealand schemes there are also thresholds for repayment with the basis
being a set proportion of additional income above this level (Chapman, 2006).
22presented diagrammatically in the Appendix.
<Table 4 about here>
The main results of Table 4 are: (i) for those receiving average graduate incomes the
length of time of a simple ICL are between 7 and 12 years; (ii) the time taken to repay for
those in the top 75 percent of graduate incomes is a low 6-9 years; (iii) the lowest income
recipients in these exercises will take 11-22 years to repay. These results are roughly
comparable to the Australian experience for similar levels of debt (Chapman, 2006).
They imply that it would seem to be straightforward to design an ICL for Germany
which would result in a range of repayment experiences consistent with those already
being experienced in those countries with apparently successful ICL arrangements.
7 Conclusion
It is very likely that in the near future the political and economic circumstances of
Germany will lead to signiﬁcant increases in higher education tuition charges. For
reasons that are well understood in the economics literature, this possibility highlights
the need for an important expansion in the availability and sizes of student loans. Two
possibilities currently used internationally are mortgage-type and income contingent
loans.
Against this background, and through reference to the conceptual diﬀerences be-
tween these approaches to student loans, this paper explores empirically some of the
important consequences of diﬀerent loan schemes. Our method involved analyses of
data from the German Microcensus 2007 from which we are able to derive a large range
of expected future income streams using linear and unconditional quantile regression
models. We diﬀerentiate between men and women residing in East and West Germany
and calculate separate repayment burdens for university graduates in each of these
groups.
With the use of the income proﬁles our major contribution is to illustrate that, with
the likely level of debts, a signiﬁcant issue emerges with respect to expected repayment
23burdens (the proportion of a graduate’s income required to repay the loan). This is
that for many graduates the burdens will be at levels considered in the literature to be
excessive, and for those with quite low incomes these burdens will be extremely high.
For many debtors under such a scheme the prospects of both consumption hardship
and loan defaults look large.
Income contingent loans do not allow high repayment burdens and this is their most
important feature. We have modelled a very simple ICL for Germany, and with the
use of the income proﬁles used in the earlier exercise we illustrate the time periods
associated with this type of loan repayment. The results suggest that an ICL would
deliver experiences similar to those of other countries using such an approach to student
ﬁnancing.
24Tables and Figures
Table 1: Tuition Fees and Public Loans
Tuition Nominal Maximum Minimum
State Fees p.a. Bank Interest Debt Net Income
Baden-W¨ urttemberg e1,000 L-Bank 3.78% e15,000 e1,060
(max. 5.5%)
Bavaria e1,000 KfW 2.69% e15,000 e1,060
F¨ orderbank (max. 7.75%)
Hamburg (until e750 KfW 2.87% e17,000 e1,060
summer 2008) F¨ orderbank (max. 7.5%)
Hesse (until e1,000 Landes- 6.16% / 0% e15,000 e1,260
summer 2008) treuhandstelle (max. 7.5%)
Lower Saxony e1,000 KfW 3.06% e15,000 e1,060
F¨ orderbank (max. 7.5%)
North-Rhine Westfalia e1,000 NRW.Bank 3.896% e10,000 e1,040
(max. 5.90%)
Saarland (until e1,000 KfW 0% <2.85% e15,000 e1,060
winter 2009/2010) F¨ orderbank (-)
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26Table 2: Summary Statistics for Sample of University Graduates
Men Women
Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
West Germany
Annual gross income 51,525 39,880 26,930 22,408
Employed 0.908 0.289 0.833 0.373
Age 45.2 10.6 43.0 10.6
Potential labour market experience 17.7 11.0 16.4 11.4
Number of observations 7,847 7,200
East Germany
Annual gross income 33,629 30,136 24,600 18,245
Employed 0.849 0.358 0.834 0.372
Age 46.8 10.8 45.0 10.5
Potential labour market experience 19.8 11.5 19.3 11.5
Number of observations 2,567 2,428
Note: Weighted numbers based on weights provided by the Microcensus.

































































































































28Table 3: Repayment Burdens of Conventional Loan Repayment Scheme (Percent)
West Germany East Germany
Mean Q25 Q50 Q75 Mean Q25 Q50 Q75
Men
Year 1 7.88 14.17 9.99 6.00 9.62 17.96 10.36 7.67
Year 2 6.96 12.44 8.58 5.32 8.71 16.27 9.51 7.04
Year 3 6.21 11.06 7.50 4.77 7.95 14.85 8.78 6.50
Year 4 5.60 9.93 6.65 4.31 7.31 13.65 8.14 6.03
Year 5 5.08 9.00 5.95 3.92 6.75 12.63 7.59 5.61
Year 6 4.65 8.21 5.39 3.59 6.27 11.74 7.10 5.25
Year 7 4.28 7.54 4.91 3.31 5.85 10.97 6.67 4.92
Year 8 3.96 6.97 4.51 3.07 5.48 10.29 6.28 4.64
Year 9 3.68 6.47 4.16 2.86 5.15 9.69 5.94 4.38
Year 10 2.46 4.31 2.76 1.91 3.48 6.55 4.03 2.97
Average 5.08 9.01 6.04 3.91 6.66 12.46 7.44 5.50
Women
Year 1 11.60 20.14 12.50 7.95 14.10 26.81 15.05 10.00
Year 2 10.81 19.29 11.73 7.38 12.81 23.85 13.52 9.08
Year 3 10.10 18.48 11.04 6.88 11.72 21.43 12.25 8.29
Year 4 9.46 17.71 10.40 6.42 10.78 19.43 11.18 7.62
Year 5 8.88 16.98 9.82 6.02 9.97 17.74 10.27 7.04
Year 6 8.36 16.29 9.28 5.65 9.26 16.31 9.49 6.54
Year 7 7.88 15.62 8.79 5.32 8.63 15.07 8.81 6.09
Year 8 7.44 14.99 8.34 5.02 8.07 14.00 8.22 5.70
Year 9 7.04 14.39 7.92 4.75 7.58 13.07 7.69 5.35
Year 10 4.77 9.88 5.38 3.22 5.10 8.76 5.17 3.61
Average 8.63 16.38 9.52 5.86 9.80 17.65 10.16 6.93
29Table 4: Repayment Duration (in years)
West Germany East Germany
Men Women Men Women
8% collection rate
Mean 7 11 9 12
Q25 11 22 15 20
Q50 8 12 10 13
Q75 6 8 7 9
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